I. Introduction
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007/2008 many governments extended public guarantees to individual banks or the entire banking system. 1 Public guarantees affect bank risk-taking via two opposing channels. They can exacerbate risk-taking by undermining market discipline (Flannery, 1998 , Sironi, 2003 , Gropp et al., 2006 while at the same time curb it by enhancing charter values (Keeley, 1990) . In addition, public guarantees may affect banks with ex ante high charter values differently from those with ex ante low charter values (Gropp and Vesala, 2004) . If banks have higher charter values and therefore more "skin in the game" they may not suffer from moral hazard. Hence, to extend public guarantees to those banks may not affect their risk taking. Overall, the net effect of public guarantees is ambiguous and depends on the interaction of charter value and moral hazard effects (Keeley, 1990 , Cordella and Yeyati, 2003 , Gropp et al., 2011 .
In this study we take advantage of a unique natural experiment that allows us to identify the net effect of government support. In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced a new assessment methodology for banks that accounts for the potential of government support. According to the new rating scheme, banks are rated based on the likelihood and predictability of timely external support, which can range from an outright guarantee to a full ownership and control (nationalization). In the rating announcement, DBRS stressed that the rating changes were based on the consequence of the new methodology being applied, and
were not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks' credit fundamentals. Furthermore, the new ratings were applied simultaneously to all banks and were not preceded by any news announcement.
Hence, the DBRS announcement represents a natural experiment similar to the one employed by Kliger and Sarig (2000) . Kliger and Sarig used the introduction of subcategories for Moody's ratings to identify the information content of ratings. They could use this rating innovation as a clean test of the information content of ratings, as the simultaneous introduction of the subcategories across all firms was not associated with a change in underlying risk of the firms or any pre-announcement news releases.
Our findings suggest a striking difference between the effects of bail out probabilities during calm times ("ex ante") versus during crisis times ("ex post"). We show that during calm times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature.
However, in crisis times, we find that non-supported banks increase their risk more than supported banks. Gropp et al. (2011) show that during normal times, non-supported banks compete more fiercely with supported banks since the latter benefit from lower refinancing costs, which pushes non-supported banks towards higher risk-taking. To the best of our knowledge, the current paper is the first to document this relationship during a crisis when funding is scarce. We show (relatively weak) evidence that supported banks maintained higher level of wholesale funding during the crisis. Furthermore, we show that the increase in risk is even smaller if the supported banks have ex-ante high charter values, consistent with the charter value view of public guarantees.
In line with a charter value argument, we conjecture that supported banks may enjoy a funding advantage during the crisis and therefore exhibit lower risk compared to banks that are not supported. At the same time we cannot rule out other explanations, as our findings would also be consistent with the idea that supported banks during crisis times are subject to greater scrutiny by supervisors that is effective in reducing risk taking, as in Berger et al. (2001) and Krainer and Lopez (2009) .
The paper adds to a voluminous literature on the effects of public guarantees on risk taking of banks.
While the evidence is somewhat mixed, the literature generally tends to conclude that banks increase their risktaking in the presence of government support. For example, large banks, which may be perceived to be "too big to fail" tend to follow riskier strategies than smaller banks (Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Gropp et al., 2011) . Public banks, on the other hand, do not appear to follow riskier strategies than private banks (De Nicolo and Loukoianova, 2007) . The evidence on the effect of government support on overall banking system stability is also mixed. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that more generous deposit insurance may increase the probability of banking crises. However, Barth et al. (2004) show that government ownership has no robust impact on bank fragility, once one controls for banking regulation and supervisory practices.
The interaction between charter values and public guarantees has not been extensively examined in the literature, since Keeley (1990) argued that the introduction of deposit insurance in the US did not have a large effect on bank risk taking, because banks in the US were heavily regulated and therefore enjoyed local market power. He argued that local market power creates higher charter values, which in turn mitigate the moral hazard effect. Indirect evidence is presented in Beck et al. (2006) , who find that systemic banking crises are less likely in countries with more concentrated banking sectors. If charter values arise from higher market power in more concentrated banking systems, this would support the hypothesis that charter values mitigate moral hazard.
Most closely related to the evidence in this paper is the evidence in Gropp and Vesala (2004) , who show that the introduction of deposit insurance in some EU countries had no effect on the risk taking of banks with higher charter values.
II. The Event
On October 6 th 2006, DBRS implemented a new methodology for bank credit ratings that makes references to support assessments (SA) and intrinsic assessments (IA) 2 . By using a four-notch scale for the SA ratings, DBRS aimed to provide more transparency and clarity on its analytical process. Based on the new methodology, ratings were assigned to each banking entity to reflect the possibility of external support for various debt instruments. According to DBRS .
..An SA-1 [rating] reflects very strong to good likelihood and predictability of timely external support, ranging from an outright guarantee to ownership and control. An SA-2 reflects the expectation of some form of systemic external support, which can be either [provided for] national institutions or local and regional banks with an important local market position and which are part of well-defined sectoral associations. An SA-3 reflects that there is no expectation of any form of timely external support, which means that the most senior debt of the bank is equivalent to DBRS's intrinsic assessment. [...] , an SA-4 is the opposite of support enhancement, where the rating of the entity in question is in fact pressured by an external third party.
Finally, it is important to note that the implementation of the new ratings was done simultaneously for all banks, and resulted in upgrades for some of the securities issued by the banks designated as SA-1/SA-2. In its announcement, DBRS stated that the rating changes were not a reflection of any change in the affected banks' credit fundamentals, and were purely driven by the introduction of the SA methodology. With that respect, the rating announcement represents a natural experiment, allowing us to study the moral hazard consequences of government support.
Appendix I lists the publically traded financial institutions implicated by the DBRS rating, which constitutes the sample for the empirical analysis to come. The group of banks that can potentially benefit from government support (SA1/SA2) includes 4 banks from Australia, 1 from Belgium, 6 from Canada, 2 from Ireland, and 4 from the U.K. The list of banks that received an SA-3 rating from DBRS and are less likely to receive external support is mainly made out of U.S. banks (41). It also includes 1 Canadian, 1 Irish, and 2 U.K.
banks.
A legitimate concern is that the DBRS ratings do not accurately reflect market expectations, as some US banks might still be considered too-big-to-fail even if rated SA-3 3 . If true, markets may have disregarded the ratings and we should not find any significant impact of the rating on bank behavior. In addition, DBRS's SA ratings were in full agreement with Fitch's Support Ratings, indicating that as of 2006, none of the US banks was likely to be bailed out.
III. Methodology
We use several risk measures that are derived from financial statements and market variables. Following the literature standard, we calculate 1 AROA ACAP Such that AROA is the average return on assets during the period, σ(ROA) is the standard deviation of ROA, and ACAP is the average of (Total Equity/Total Assets) during the period. A lower Z-score indicates more risktaking by the bank. We also consider σ(ROA) by itself as another measure of risk-taking Market-based risk indicators are calculated using weekly stock return data. We define bank Total Risk as the standard deviation of stock returns during the period. In addition, bank Specific Risk is the standard deviation of the error term from the following market model regression 2 where is the stock return of Bank i, and is the return on the value-weighted market portfolio of each bank's respective country.
We construct a window-period around the event and calculate the banks' riskiness within this window. Stock-return data is from CRSP. Data for all other banks were obtained from Bloomberg. We supplemented this information using annual reports and financial results obtained from the internet when necessary.
IV. Government Support and Risk Taking
We report the mean and median risk measures during the post period in Table 1 . The banks are categorized according to whether or not they benefit from a government support according to DBRS. The mean and median comparison tests show that the supported banks exhibit significantly lower risk (significant at the 1 percent level) after the DBRS announcement for all but the z-score risk measures. This result is surprising since most of the empirical literature concludes that public guarantees increase risk-taking.
In order to check risk taking developments for the banks in our sample before and after the rating change and for banks with and without support, we calculate 6-months rolling risk measures for 14 periods (i.e. period Figure I plots these rolling risk-measures and exhibits a number of important characteristics. Before the rating introduction, the risk profiles of supported and non-supported banks are almost indistinguishable. After the introduction of the ratings, supported and non-supported banks' risk starts to increase (presumably reflecting the onset of the crisis), but the increase seems significantly more pronounced for non-supported banks compared to supported banks. This tends to contradict the moral hazard view of public guarantees and lends some support to the charter value view (Cordella and Yeyati, 2003) .
The evidence in Table 1 and in Figure 1 is univariate. In particular, there may be important heterogeneity across countries that may account for some of the patterns, due to differences in regulatory regimes, business cycles, accounting standards, or institutional characteristics. Our next step is to estimate the relationship between risk taking and government support in a series of regressions. The nature of the introduction of the new rating by DBRS lends itself to a difference in differences specification. The advantage of this model is that under some conditions it permits a causal interpretation of the coefficients as in a random treatment experiment. The treatment in our case is the news that DBRS considers some banks (and not others) "too big to fail" or otherwise explicitly or implicitly insured. Hence, we estimate the following "difference-indifferences" specification:
where we use each of the risk measures as the dependent variables (Y it ). A lower Z-score or a higher σ(ROA),
Total Risk or Specific Risk reflect increased risk-taking by banks. Post =1 for the post-event period. GS = 1 for banks that DBRS designates as SA-1/SA-2 (i.e. benefiting from a government support). Finally, k δ represents country fixed-effects for Australia, Canada, the EU (Irish and Belgian banks), the U.K. and the U.S.
The results of the first set of regressions are reported in Table 2 . The Post dummy indicates that all banks increased risk taking. This is expected since our post window overlaps with the 2007/08 financial crisis and consistent with Figure 1 . For our purposes, the most interesting finding is that the univariate result from Figure 1 seems to hold up, as supported banks increased their risk taking less during the post-event period compared to banks without a support. The Post*GS coefficient is negative and significant (at the 1%) in the σ(ROA), Total Risk and Specific Risk regressions. It is, however, insignificant for z-score.
This stands in sharp contrast to most of the empirical findings on the effect of government support (see for example Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Gertler, 1994 and Gropp et al., 2010) , which largely finds that public guarantees result in higher risk taking. It also contradicts theory, which maintains that public guarantees reduce market discipline because creditors anticipate their bank's bail-out and therefore have lower incentives to monitor the bank's risk-taking or to demand risk premia for higher observed risk-taking (Flannery 1998; Sironi 2003; Gropp, Vesala, and Vulpes 2006) . The effect is similar to that discussed in the deposit insurance literature (Merton 1977) . If depositors are protected by a guarantee, they will punish their bank less for risktaking, reducing market discipline. However, it is consistent with theoretical literature assigning an important role for charter values in the risk decision of banks (Keeley, 1990, Cordella and Yeyati, 2003) and consistent with some evidence in Gropp and Vesala (2004) and Gropp et al. (2011) . Hence, we next explicitly include charter values in the regressions.
V. The Net Effect of Government Support -The role of Charter Values
One way to reconcile the surprising results in Table 2 is to consider the interaction between government support and bank charter value. Keeley (1990) was the first to show that higher charter values decrease the incentives for excessive risk-taking, because the threat of losing future rents acts as a deterrent to risk-taking.
Government support result in higher charter values for protected banks due to lower refinancing costs. This tends to reduce the protected banks' risk-taking. Hence, as argued theoretically by Cordella and Yeyati (2003) and by Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) , the net effect of government support on the risk-taking of protected banks is ambiguous and depends on the relative impact of the two channels, i.e. the reduction in market discipline versus the increase in charter value.
To disentangle the two channels, we follow the literature standard and use Tobin's Q as a proxy for a bank's charter value such that: We therefore next estimate the following difference-in-differences specification such that
where Post represents the post event period and GS equals one if the bank is recognized by DBRS as benefiting from a government support. Post*GS takes the value of one for supported banks in the post-event period, and
HighQ is a dummy equals to one for banks that are above the median charter value for their country. The term Post*GS*HighQ captures the impact of the pre-event charter value on the post-event behavior of affected banks. Finally, as in equation (3), k δ represents country fixed-effects.
The results for this specification are presented in Table 3 . As before, Post is highly significant and positively associated with risk. The negative coefficient on Post*GS indicates that supported banks had lower risk based on the Total or Specific risk measures (1% significance). Finally, our variable of interest, Post*GS*HighQ, indicates that supported banks with a higher charter value increased their risk ex-post less compared to banks with low charter values, given the positive coefficient in the Z-score regression (5% significance) and the negative coefficient in the σ(ROA) regression (10% significance). However, for the market risk measures the Post*GS*HighQ coefficient is not significant.
VI. Normal times versus crisis times
The above analysis does not provide unambiguous evidence on the relation between charter value, government support and risk-taking. The short window results are presented in Table 4 . The results tend to confirm the prior empirical evidence in the literature and contradict our earlier finding. Under both market risk measures, supported banks increase risk-taking during the 6 months period following the DBRS announcement more than non-supported banks given the positive and significant Post*GS coefficient. This is in sharp contrast with the results in Table   2 , in which Post*GS is negative and significant for most risk measures. Interestingly, for the shorter window charter values do not have any explanatory power for explaining bank risk taking as the coefficient on Post*GS*HighQ is insignificant and also economically small.
One potential explanation for the relatively reduced risk taking of supported banks during the crisis (ex post) may be better access to wholesale funding during the crisis. If the government support is truly effective, then investors would be willing to extend funding and the supported banks should maintain access to the market. We check this in Appendix 2. In a difference in differences specification similar to the one for risk, we confirm that the wholesale funding (measured as the ratio of non-retail deposits to total liabilities) is higher ex post for banks that benefitted from a government support according to DBRS. While the effect is positive, it is only weakly significant.
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VII. Discussion and conclusion
In October 2006, Dominion Bond Rating Service (DBRS) introduced a new rating methodology for banks that accounts for the potential of government support. According to the new rating scheme, banks were rated based on the likelihood and predictability of timely external support. In the rating announcement, DBRS stressed that the rating changes were not a reflection of any changes in the respective banks' credit fundamentals. In addition, the ratings were applied to all banks simultaneously and were not preceded by any news announcement. Hence, the announcement by DBRS represents a natural experiment to evaluate the consequences of bail out expectations for bank behavior.
The results suggest a striking difference between the effects of high bail out probabilities during calm times ("ex ante") versus during crisis times ("ex post"). Our sample is uniquely suited to distinguish between the two, as we are able to define samples that include and that exclude the 2007/08 financial crisis. It appears that during normal times, higher bail-out probabilities result in higher risk taking, consistent with the moral hazard view and much of the empirical literature. However, in crisis times, we find that banks with higher bail out probabilities tend to increase their risk taking less compared to other banks. Gropp et al. (2011) show evidence on the competitive distortions introduced by government support during calm periods, which induce non-supported banks to increase risk-taking. Our paper presents consistent evidence for a crisis period. We also show that the increase in risk is even smaller if the banks have ex ante high charter values and have better access to wholesale deposit funding during the crisis, although the effect is small and econometrically only weakly significant. This is consistent with the charter value view of public guarantees.
At the same time, the results also suggest that charter values are only part of the explanation and there may be other important reasons for our findings. For example, our evidence is also consistent with the idea that regulators supervise supported banks more closely than non-supported banks during a crisis. The empirical literature documents that supervisory standards change with respect to economic conditions and that banks experience tighter monitoring during crises versus boom periods. (Berger et al., 2001; Krainer and Lopez, 2009 ). (October 7, 2006 -March 31, 2007 . Charter value proxied by Tobins' q = (book value assets + market value equity -book value equity) / (book value assets). Tobin's q is the average of its components prior to the DBRS announcement. For quarterly banks, it is calculated between 6/2005 and 9/2006. For semi-annual banks, it is calculated between 12/2004 and 6/2006. GS = 1 for supported banks. High Q = 1 for banks above their country's median Q. Robust standard errors clustered at the bank level are reported in brackets. Regressions include unreported country fixed effects. ***, **, * Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
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